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ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on aspects related to the functioning of the gossip networks
underlying three relatively popular cryptocurrencies: Ethereum, Nano and IOTA.
We look at topics such as automatic discovery of peers when a new node joins
the network, bandwidth usage of a node, message passing protocols and storage
schemas and optimizations for the shared ledger. We believe this is a topic that is
often overlooked in works about blockchains and cryptocurrencies. Vulnerabilities
and inefficiencies attain a higher significance than ones in a regular open source
project because of the rather direct financial implications of these projects. Barring
Bitcoin, a network that has been around for nearly 10 years, no other project has
substantial documentation for its operational details other than scattered and sparse
pages in the source code repositories. Almost all of the content described here has
been extracted by studying the source code of the reference implementations of these
projects.
We evaluate the use of Invertible Bloom Lookup Tables and the Graphene pro-
tocol to decrease block propagation times and bandwidth usage of certain messages.
We perform realistic simulations that show significant improvements. We provide a
complete implementation of Graphene in Geth, Ethereum’s main node software and
test this implementation against the main Ethereum blockchain.
We also crawled the chosen cryptocurrency networks for publicly visible nodes
and provide an Autonomous System-level breakdown of these nodes with the end
goal of estimating the ease of performing attacks such as BGP hijacks and their
impact.
Code written for implementing Graphene in Geth, performing various simu-
lations and for other miscellaneous tasks has been uploaded to Github at https:
//github.com/sunfinite/masters-thesis.
vii
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Consensus in distributed systems has been well-studied for at least four decades.
Seminal results such as the Byzantine Generals Problem [2] and the FLP impossi-
bility [3] date back to 1982 and 1985 respectively. The authors of the FLP result
formalize consensus to achieving the following three properties in a system [4]:
• termination: all participants decide on a state eventually;
• agreement: all participants decide on the same value for the state;
• validity: the value must have been proposed by one of the participants and
not arrived at by default.
Consensus in the presence of misbehaving or malicious participants was the
crux of this early research. The Byzantine Generals Problem states this scenario as
a group of military generals who have to decide on a single time to launch an attack.
They do this by passing messages and there might be traitors who willingly distort
not just their own messages but also other messages passing through them. The FLP
impossibility states that consensus cannot be achieved in an asynchronous system
where any system can fail silently. The solution to the Byzantine Generals Problem
assumes synchronicity and puts a limit of 2k + 1 honest generals in the presence
of k traitors to achieve consensus. Later consensus protocols such as Paxos [5] and
Raft [6] also require leader election and knowledge of the participants to achieve
consensus. The problem with these systems is that they do not perform efficiently
at the scale of an open network like the Internet.
Bitcoin [7] sidestepped the requirement of knowing other participants before-
hand by having participants follow the general who presents a cryptographic proof
of the most power in a round of consensus. As long as a simple majority of par-
ticipants stay honest and follow the right winner, the state of the system achieves
consensus.
1
2To become the winner of a consensus round, a participant has to provide the
solution to a hard cryptographic puzzle. The chances of finding a solution are only
dependent on the amount of compute power the participant puts into the problem.
Upon winning a round, the participant gets to decide the next update to the shared
state that is being maintained locally in all participants. Each update consists of set
of transactions transferring value from one public key to another. These transactions
grouped together form a block. And since these are updates to a previous balance
of a public key, each block has to refer to a previous block that it is updating in its
proof, thus forming a chain of blocks i.e. a blockchain. The winner of a round gets
a pre-determined amount of newly minted coins — they have now mined new coins
into existence — as a reward for putting in the work behind producing the block.
Since any participant can work towards producing the next block, they need
to have knowledge of all ongoing transactions that can possibly be included in the
next block. Blockchains achieve this scenario by implementing a peer-to-peer gossip
network where every transaction propagates to every known node on the network.
1.1.1 Graphene
Graphene [1] is a protocol to reduce the bandwidth consumption during block
propagation in a peer-to-peer blockchain. Currently, when a new block is propagated
to a peer, all the transactions in that block are re-transmitted even though the gossip
network would have already broadcast these transactions with a high probability
when they were originally submitted.
Two prior solutions have been proposed to avoid this duplicate data transfer in
Bitcoin: Compact Blocks [8] and X-treme Thin Blocks [9]. Instead of including full
transactions, Compact Blocks only send 6-byte short transaction IDs. The peer then
makes a special request for transactions not present locally. In X-treme Thin Blocks,
the receiver first builds a Bloom filter from the transactions present with them and
transmits it to the sender. The sender checks this Bloom filter to determine which
transactions need to be sent in full. IDs of all transactions in the block are also sent.
Graphene reduces the cost of propagation even further than the above two
protocols by never sending the full list of transaction IDs. Instead, a special data
3structure called Invertible Bloom Lookup Table (IBLT) [10] is constructed by both
parties wanting to exchange a block. The peer with the block transmits this encoded
data structure which is then used by the other peer to perform set reconciliation
with its own local IBLT. The goal of efficient set reconciliation is to find the union
Si∪Sj of two sets Si and Sj whose symmetric difference d =| Si−Sj | + | Sj−Si | is
low when compared to the cardinality of Si and Sj. IBLTs require only O(d) space
to find the difference instead of O(n). Graphene also uses a Bloom filter to reduce
the number of transactions added to the local IBLT at the receiver. This improves
the chances of recovering the difference from the remote IBLT. For a listing of the
steps followed by Graphene for propagating blocks and a detailed description of
Bloom filters and IBLT, see Appendix A.
Transactions that are not yet included in a block are stored in the peer’s
mempool. In a well-connected network, these mempools should be in sync with a
very high probability. Graphene relies on this property to formulate block propaga-
tion as a set reconciliation problem. The cost of propagation a block in graphene in
given by:
T (a) = n
−ln( a
m−n)
8ln2(2)
+ adτ
where, m = number of transactions in the receiver’s mempool,
n = number of transactions in the block,
a = expected symmetric difference between the two IBLTs,
τ = cost in number of bytes of each cell of an IBLT,
and d = Constant factor introduced to increase in the number of cells in the IBLT
to improve chances of recovery [11].
In the equation above, the left operand signifies the cost of the Bloom filter
and the right operand signifies the cost of the IBLT.
41.2 Contributions
1.2.1 Documentation and Improvements
We provide comprehensive documentation of the protocols behind various net-
working and operational aspects of three cryptocurrencies: Nano, Ethereum and
IOTA. We know of no similar undertaking for these projects currently. We also
propose and evaluate improvements to different parts of these protocols. The im-
provements along with a brief summary of the cryptocurrencies are described below.
1.2.1.1 Nano
Nano [19] tries to remove the latency inherent in Proof of Work blockchains
where transactions are confirmed only when a block is produced by a miner. It
uses a model similar to Delegated Proof of Stake(DPoS) [48] where each account
nominates a representative to vote on its behalf. Voting takes places to resolve
conflicts about updates to the shared ledger. Votes are included as a part of the
updates themselves rather than as a separate process. Nano also breaks down a
single block of transactions into small blocks containing just one transaction. In
effect, this amounts to each account having its own blockchain. This structure
reduces the contention for shared resources provided by the participants in the
network. Unlike Bitcoin where a small reward is provided to the miner who provides
a valid block Nano also does not have incentives for confirming transactions. Active
users themselves have to participate in the upkeep of the network thereby reiterating
the Stakeholder model. The rationale behind this is that once a participant owns
a high enough stake of the value in the network, they are automatically vested in
ensuring its proper functioning since any aberration would mean a decrease in the
value of their stake.
In Section 2.7.1 we list a vulnerability we discovered in Nano’s node discovery
protocol. We were able to eclipse all connections made by Nano node and also
make it unresponsive in under 10 minutes by just executing one instance of the
attack requests. Given Nano’s small network footprint (detailed in Section 2.5), the
entire network can be attacked to induce massive delays using just a few machines.
This vulnerability has been reported to the development team and a patch is being
5implemented at the time of writing.
In Section 2.7.2 we evaluate a proposal to use IBLTs in a key periodic sync
message sent by Nano. Nano’s bandwidth usage has already been the subject of
complaints [34] [35]. We show that using IBLTs produces a decrease of three orders
of magnitude in bytes transferred and also speeds up the processing of this message
by about the same amount.
1.2.1.2 Ethereum
Ethereum [17] is the second-most valuable cryptocurrency after Bitcoin. It cur-
rently follows the same underlying principles of operation as Bitcoin wherein nodes
have to perform computation to produce a block. The key differentiating factor for
Ethereum is its ability to treat transactions as full-fledged computer programs rather
than just denoting a transfer of coin. This lets us run arbitrary code whose exe-
cution and data can be publicly verified on the blockchain. These programs called
Smart Contracts have been used to implement a wide range of applications from
decentralized mutual funds to collectible cats which are guaranteed to be digitally
unique.
In Section 3.7.2, we detail the implementation and evaluation of using Graphene
to propagate blocks in Geth, Ethereum’s reference node implementation written in
Golang. Over 60% of public Ethereum nodes run Geth. Ethereum has a much faster
block production time than Bitcoin (≈ 15 seconds) and has no implemented feature
to optimize block propagation (like Compact Blocks in Bitcoin). Ethereum also
has a higher transaction rate because of automated calls from Smart Contract ex-
ecutions. This increases Graphene’s relevance in reducing latencies and bandwidth
usage on the Ethereum network to keep up with the block and transaction rate.
1.2.1.3 IOTA
Similar to Nano, IOTA does not rely on the standard Bitcoin view of the
blockchain but instead uses a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) of transactions to
achieve consensus. This DAG is called the ‘Tangle’ and relies on each transaction
referring to two previous transactions in the Tangle as a way of providing confir-
mation to these transactions. A transaction’s confidence score is directly tied to
6the number of transactions which reference it and is similar to the concept of block
depth in Bitcoin. A new transaction chooses an old transaction to refer by per-
forming a weighted random walk starting from the genesis transaction. Section 4.2
provides more details about this process.
In Section 4.7, we evaluate the use of cuckoo filters to implement a fast lookup
cache to check if a transaction can be used as a part of a snapshot to update account
balances. This eliminates two disk reads per transaction.
1.2.2 Network Analysis
Attack vectors like BGP hijacking [12] on public cryptocurrency networks can
have a significant impact if they succeed in cutting off a considerable fraction of
online nodes. Such attacks could also feed false messages and views of the blockchain
to the targeted section of nodes. There have been only a couple of studies looking
at centralization in Bitcoin at the Autonomous System (AS) level. Feld et al. [14]
pointed out that only 10 ASes contain as many 30% of all public Bitcoin nodes.
Apostolaki et al. [13] described the design of partitioning and delay attacks that
could be performed using the topology that existed at that time. They found found
that nodes which account for almost 50% of the blocks produced in Bitcoin could
be isolated by hijacking only 39 prefixes. They were even able to demonstrate
diversion of traffic meant for their own AS via a false BGP announcement in under
2 minutes. Analysing BGP adversitements, they found that at least 100 Bitcoin
nodes are victims of hijacks each month. Other attempts to subvert the Bitcoin
network via false BGP advertisements have already been observed [15]. In this
attack, the attackers were able to successfully steal the mining work performed by
a portion of a pool.
We perform a similar AS-level analysis for the three cryptocurrencies we are
considering. We also provide a country-level breakdown of nodes because the number
of participants in a cryptocurrency without proof-of-work incentives might serve as
a reliable estimate of the adoption of the currency for purposes other than mere
speculation.
71.2.3 Transaction ordering in Graphene
Graphene can reliably determine which transactions from a node’s mempool
belong to a block. It can also recover transaction IDs which may not be present in
our mempool. But it does not provide information about how the transactions are
ordered within a block. This is a consequence of the randomized hashing performed
during insertion into the IBLT. Ordering is critical if more than one transaction
updates the same account in the same block. Ordering is also needed to generate
the right Merkle root that is included in the block header. Graphene proposes an
O(n) solution that relies on a pre-determined sort function for transaction IDs (eg.
lexicographicallly) and then transmitting nlog(n) bits containing the indices. We
propose and evaluate an alternate idea that seeks to avoid sorting and also utilize
IBLT’s valueSum field and the same hashing procedure to encode index positions.
We transaction indices are encoded in this fashion, procedures to solve Constraint
Satisfaction Problems (See chapter 5 of [50]) can be used to decode their values.
Our solution utilizes the valueSum field of the graphene IBLT. Each valueSum
field is further divided into b buckets where each bucket is large enough to hold a
transaction index. This gives us the value of b as:
b =
v
dlog2ne
8
where v is the number of bytes per valueSum field.
When a transaction is inserted into the IBLT, it is added to k cells. For each
transaction t inserted into cell i, its index bucket bti is given by:
bti = ti mod b
where ti is the i
th byte of transaction t.
At the senders end, the value of the index bucket is updated to:
bti = bti + I(t)
where I(t) is the index of transaction t.
8Assuming that the k hash functions are independent and the transaction IDs
are generated using a uniformly distributed hash function, each bucket will be the
sum of n/bk transaction indices.
At the receivers end, bti is the RHS of a linear constraint. The receiver gen-
erates a constraint by keeping track of all transactions t1..p that fall into an index
bucket:
I(t1) + I(t2) + . . .+ I(tp) = bti
We now define the parameters of the CSP:
Variables:I(t1), . . . , I(tn)
Domain: 1 to n
Constraints: l linear equations where l lies between k + 2 and kb + 2. The two
constant constraints are:
n∑
i=1
I(ti) = n(n+ 1)/2
MerkleRoot(t1, . . . , tn) = merkle root in block header
1.2.3.1 Evaluation
We simulated addition of transaction indices to IBLTs by generating random
transaction IDs, ordering them and encode the order as index sums in the IBLT. At
the other end, the procedure was repeated to find the IDs which map to a specific
bucket. Once the equations have been generated, we remove the unary constraints
(equations with only one variable) and substitute its value in the other equations.
We then recursively simplify equations using the same procedure. Decoding all
index values in this fashion is our ideal case since we did have not guess any value.
Figure 1.1 shows that this happens with a very high probability when the number
of buckets is at least 1.3 times the number of transactions. 1000 trials with different
transaction counts were performed for each bucket to transaction count ratio.
To bring this ratio down to 1, we considered two ideas. The first idea is to
reduce this to a problem of finding n unknowns using n equations and then solving
the matrix Ax = b. To do this, we first recursively simplify all unary constraints.
We then send unencoded transaction indices of the minimum number of transactions
9Figure 1.1: Successful index recoveries without guessing
Table 1.1: Number of unencoded indices transferred for 400 transactions
1.0 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.8
25 36 57 71 85
required to reduce the number of unknowns to be equal to the number of equations.
Table 1.1 lists the number of unencoded indices that had to be sent for different
bucket ratios with the number of transactions fixed at 400 (which is a comfortable
upper bound for Ethereum blocks, see Section 3.7.2)
The second approach we considered is to use depth first search backtrack-
ing with forward checking and minimum remaining value (MRV) heuristics. This
technique is used to solve standard Constraint Satisfaction Problems such as map
coloring. Using our bare bones simulation, ee were not able to generate the correct
assignment within a reasonable amount of guesses and the additional computation
required to continue the inference process negates any processing or bandwidth gains
over sorting or other methods.
1.2.4 Evaluating Graphene for unsynchronized mempools
Graphene assumes a very high similarity between mempool of two nodes ex-
changing blocks. We relaxed this assumption and calculated the bytes required by
averaging data from 5 randomly chosen real Bitcoin blocks. This scenario may occur
if a node has suffered a network outage for an extended period of time or has a very
10
Figure 1.2: Bytes transferred during block propagation
Figure 1.3: Number of missing transactions
high round trip times.
Figure1.2 shows the number of bytes required by the three efficient block
propagation protocols that we have seen. It shows that Graphene fares worse than
Compact and Xthin blocks when the mempool differ by over 10% though the cost of
transferring the encoded block is eclipsed by the number of bytes required to fetch
the actual missing transactions as the similarity decreases. Figure1.3 shows the the
number of missing transactions versus mempool similarity averaged over the same
5 blocks.
2. Nano
2.1 Node Discovery
A client running Nano starts by connecting to pre-configured bootnodes ob-
tained by resolving rai.raiblocks.net. keepalive messages are sent over UDP to
each of the resolved IP address. Only IPv6 addresses are considered and any IPv4
address is mapped to its IPv6 equivalent. Peers respond with another keepalive
message on receipt of a keepalive message. Each keepalive message includes the
addresses of at most eight peers chosen randomly from the sender’s peer list. The
receiver checks if each address in the received list is a valid peer address and if it
is a new peer, a keepalive message is sent and the process repeats. There is no
restriction placed currently on the number of peers a client can have. The protocol
version being used is included in the header of all messages transmitted in Nano.
This version is validated against the minimum protocol version supported at the
receiver and the peer is dropped otherwise. The keepalive procedure is repeated
every 60 seconds. For each run of the procedure, peers that haven’t been heard
from in the last 300 seconds are dropped . A keepalive message is also sent when
we receive a publish, confirm req or confirm ack message.
2.2 Block Synchronization
Before we delve into how blocks are synchronized, let’s take a look at the
different types of blocks in Nano. A block is defined to contain only one transaction
such that it can fit into a single UDP packet (65535 bytes). In contrast to other
blockchains, blocks are tied to a specific account and are signed by the private key
corresponding to the account ID, which is the base-58 encoding of a public key.
Send block: A send block is created when value is being transferred to
someone. This block has to refer a previous block belonging to the account that
initiated the transfer. The other fields are the destination account ID and the
amount being transferred.
Open block: If the destination account in a send block does not exist on
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the blockchain, an open block has to be published to claim the amount. An open
block does not have a reference to a previous block but instead refers to the send
block as the source. The other fields are the ID of the account being created and
representative account who will vote on the new account’s behalf. An account can
be its own representative.
Note that for a new account to appear on the blockchain it has to have a valid
endorsement from an existing account in the form of a send block. The genesis
block is a special open block (Listing 2.1).
Listing 2.1: Nano genesis block
{
type : open ,
source : E89208DD038FBB269987689621D52292AE9C35941A7484756ECCED92A65093BA ,
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e : xrb 3t6k35gi95xu6tergt6p69ck76ogmitsa8mnijtpxm9fkcm736xtoncuohr3 ,
account : xrb 3t6k35gi95xu6tergt6p69ck76ogmitsa8mnijtpxm9fkcm736xtoncuohr3 ,
work : 62 f05417dd3fb691 ,
s i g n a t u r e : 9F0C933C8ADE004D808EA1985FA746A7E95BA2A38F867640F53EC8F180BDFE9E2
C1268DEAD7C2664F356E37ABA362BC58E46DBA03E523A7B5A19E4B6EB12BB02
}
The source block being referenced does not exist on the blockchain. The
balance for the genesis account is set to 2128− 1, which is the total number of Nano
that can ever be in circulation.
The message included in the signature is the blake2b hash of the concatenation
of account ID, representative ID and the source block hash.
Receive block: A receive block is created by the destination account of a
pending send block. On a successful publish of this block, the corresponding send
block is said to be ‘pocketed’. The fields in this block include the hash of the send
block as the source and the hash of the previous block belonging to the destination
account.
Change block: A change block is published when an account wants to change
the delegated representative. The fields in this block include the new representative
account ID and the hash of the previous head block of the account being modified.
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State block: A new type of block which seeks to unify the different block
types into a single container. The fields in this block include the ID of the account
publishing this block, the balance for this account, the hash of the previous block
belonging to this account, representative ID and a link field which refers to the
source block hash in a receive scenario or to a destination account in a send scenario.
Since nano does not have a canonical block height, the method chosen to enable
new non-backwards-compatible features is to generate pre-determined transactions
and have the code check for the presence of these transactions. State blocks are
being enabled via two such canary blocks: one to let nodes that state blocks can be
parsed and another to let nodes generate state blocks. At the time of writing, only
the parse canary block has been published.
2.2.1 Bootstrapping
On node boot, a certain number of peers with network version greater than 5
are chosen and contacted for synchronization. The target number of peers to contact
is determined using the method listed in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Number of peers to contact on node start
1: minPeers← 4 . Can be changed at start
2: maxPeers← 64 . Can be changed at start
3: estBlocksPerBootstrap← 50000
4: procedure GetBootstrapPeerCount(pullsInProgress)
5: step← pullsInProgress/estBlocksPerBootstrap
6: target← minPeers+ (maxPeers−minPeers) ∗ step
7: return max(1, target)
8: end procedure
If the node is still waiting for peers, this selection is attempted every 5 seconds
for the first 3 times (aggressive warmup) and cools down to every 300 seconds
subsequently. The actual number of new bootstrap connections to be established is
further determined using the function listed in Algorithm 2.
The target number of peers obtained above is doubled with the rationale that
not many peers respond to bootstrap requests and hence more attempts than neces-
sary have to be made. There is no check whether a peer has already been contacted
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Algorithm 2 Number of bootstrap connections actually established
1: target← GetBootstrapPeerCount(pullsInProgress)
2: procedure GetNewConnectionCount(activeConnCount)
. activeConnCount includes both pullsInProgress and idle connections not
yet scheduled for a pull
3: maxNewBoostrapAttempts← 10
4: connCount = (target− activeConns) ∗ 2
5: return min(connCount,maxNewBootstrapAttempts)
6: end procedure
when selecting and even though the time of the last bootstrap attempt is main-
tained per peer it is currently not utilized anywhere in code. Once a connection is
established, it is added to an idle queue.
The bootstrap process then picks a connection from the idle queue and makes
a frontier request over it. The peer responds with all account IDs in its blockchain
and the corresponding block hash of the latest block for that account (the head
block). The request may optionally include an age for accounts and count but these
are set to INT MAX for bootstrap requests. Each ID, hash pair results in a socket
write/read operation. The node keeps track of the read rate and if it falls below
1000 pairs per second the frontier request is aborted. If this is not the first time
that the node is being started, there may be accounts stored locally. The returned
account is compared with the latest local account and if the local account is greater,
it means that the bootstrap peer does not know about this account — this is because
the database stores accounts in a lexicographically sorted order — and head blocks
of accounts greater than the returned account are added to an unsynced list which
is used for a bulk pushed later. If the returned and local accounts match and the
returned block hash is already in the local blockchain, then a bulk push is scheduled
for the missing block hashes. We haven’t actually pulled the real blocks themselves,
so if we have gotten this far and a push wasn’t needed, a pull is scheduled for this
account with the block hash returned in the frontier response.
After the frontier request completes, the idle connection pool is now utilized
to run the scheduled bulk block pulls. The connection pool does not remain static.
If a connection’s block fetch rate falls below 10 blocks per second (≈ 1.5Kbps), it
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is removed from the connection pool and the pool is repopulated using the target
calculated above. While repopulating, if the current pull connections count is more
than 2/3 of the new target then the slowest
√
target connections and dropped and
new connections established. This metric has been picked arbitrarily and could use
some tuning.
After all the pulls are complete, the unsynced list is iterated and each block
and its dependencies (previous or source blocks) are pushed to the peer. The same
connection pooling strategy is used as before. In the block propagation section, we
will take a look at how a block is validated and confirmed.
All bootstrap related messages and data are transmitted via TCP. Other node
to node communication is via UDP over the same port.
2.3 Block Propagation
For a block to validated, the hash of its root and work value (a 64-bit integer)
should be less than publish threshold. This threshold is currently 0xffffffc000000000
for the main network which is estimated to require at least 5 seconds of calculations
on a reasonably powerful laptop. This acts as the rate limit for blocks and hence
transactions.
As soon as a valid block is observed, an election for this block is started by
having all representative accounts local to the node’s wallet vote for this block. The
block is rebroadcast using a plain publish message if there are no local represen-
tatives. The number of peers for rebroadcast is set to the square root of the total
number. If there are local representatives, a confirm ack message is sent containing
the vote for this block. This announcement cycle is repeated every 16 milliseconds
and the number of announcements across all elections are limited to 32 per cycle as
a flow control mechanism. After four successful announcements have been made for
a block, its vote is tallied and if the weights of representatives that have voted for it
exceeds quorum, the block is considered confirmed. A representative’s weight is the
sum of its own balance and the balances of all other accounts that have designated it
as a representative. Quorum is currently set at more than half of total valid supply.
The remaining balance of the genesis account and coins sent to the burn address
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(all 0s) are excluded from the valid supply.
A fork is detected when the current block’s previous block is not the frontier
transaction for this account. Upon detection, confirm req messages for both the
current block and the previous blocks immediate confirmed successor are broadcast
to selected peers (see representative crawling below). Upon receiving a confirm req
message, the peer will start an election of its own for this block and respond with
a confirm ack message for any existing successor of the current block’s previous
block.
2.3.1 Representative crawling
confirm req messages are broadcast only to those peers which might have rep-
resentative accounts and can vote in an election. This is determined by periodically
sending confirm req messages for a randomly chosen block to all peers and check-
ing the responses for a confirm ack message. The peer’s possible representative
account and its weight are stored.
2.4 Block Storage
Nano uses Lightning DB [30], a memory-mapped persistent key-value store.
Memory mapping limited databases to only 4GB on 32-bit architectures. This
limitation does not exist on 64-bit architectures and Nano uses a memory mapped
file that can grow up to 1TB.
Table 2.1 lists the different types of keys that can occur and the format of
their values.
2.5 Network Analysis
We crawled the Nano network by sending only keepalive messages as these
already include a list of at most eight peers. We were able to detect over 500 public
nodes. This data was validated and augmented by other public sources [33]. ASN
and geoip data was fetched from RIPE [44], Routeviews [42] and Geolite [43]
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of nodes by country. Colombia is a surprising
presence on the list.
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Table 2.1: Schema of tables in Nano
Name Key Value
frontiers block hash account
account account <head block hash, representative, bal-
ance, last change>
send blocks block hash send block
receive block block hash receive block
open blocks block hash open block
change block block hash change block
pending block hash <sender, amount, destination>
blocks info block hash <account, balance>
representation account weight
unchecked block hash block
unsynced block hash
vote account uint64
Table 2.2: Top 5 ASNs with public Nano nodes
ASNum Name Percentage of nodes
14061 DIGITALOCEAN-ASN - DigitalOcean 26.6
14080 Telmex Colombia S.A. 16.8
16276 OVH - OVH SAS 4.6
24940 HETZNER-AS - Hetzner Online
GmbH
4
16509 AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com 3.7
ASN 14061 contains over a quarter of Nano’s nodes(Table 2.2). Nano’s node
distribution has a very long tail(Figure 2.2b).
2.6 Networking Protocol
This section lists the various messages transmitted by nodes running Nano.
We’ve already covered these messages while describing the node operation above.
The following serves as a formal listing.
A header is included in every message that is sent. The header fields are as
follows:
1. magic number: The letters RC for the main network
2. version max: Maximum version of the messaging and consensus protocol sup-
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Figure 2.1: Country-wise distribution of 541 public Nano nodes
Figure 2.2: ASNs containing public Nano nodes
(a) CDF (b) Count
ported by this client
3. version min
4. version using
5. type: An integer indicating which of the messaged described below is being
sent.
6. extensions: A single byte to indicate any special handling for this message.
2.6.1 Messages
1. keepalive
This message is sent to inform a peer of our presence and our knowledge of
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other peers.
Fields :
(a) peers: A list of up to 8 peers.
2. publish
This message is sent when a new transaction occurs. Each transaction is
wrapped in its own block.
Fields :
(a) block: Please refer to Section 2.2 for a description of the different fields
present in a block.
3. frontier req
This message is sent to a peer to fetch the latest block (frontier) for an account
or a list of accounts.
Fields :
(a) start: The request is for frontiers of accounts greater than or equal
to this field. As mentioned before, accounts are stored on disk in a
lexicographic manner.
(b) age: The response should only contain frontiers for accounts which have
changed in the last age seconds.
(c) count: Maximum number of frontiers to be sent in the response.
4. bulk pull
A bulk pull message is sent for each account that is determined to be out of
sync via frontier req.
Fields :
(a) account
(b) end: The response should contain blocks only until this hash. This indi-
cates that end is the highest known local block for this account currently.
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5. bulk push
A bulk push message is sent for each account that was determined to be out
of sync at the remote peer to which we sent the frontier req.
After a bulk push message containing just the header is sent, a list of serialized
blocks are sent over the same connection.
6. confirm req
Two confirmreq messages are sent upon the detection of a fork, one for each
of the conflicting blocks
This message consists of the header followed by the serialized block.
7. confirm acq
This message indicates a vote for a block. The weight of the vote is equal to
the weight of the representative whose signature is present in this message.
Fields :
(a) sequence: An integer indicating the current round of voting on this
block.
(b) block: Block that is being voted on.
(c) account: Representative account that is generating this vote.
(d) signature: A confirmation that the vote is indeed generated by the said
representative account.
2.7 Experiments
2.7.1 Keepalive messages
A peer is added to Nano’s peer list if it sends a valid keepalive message. Nano
does not restrict the number of peers that can be added this way. Using UDP makes
it hard to detect if the response keepalive message was delivered to an open port.
So we can flood Nano’s peer table at a very low cost by spoofing IPs. These peers
are removed only after the next cutoff period (5 minutes) because they haven’t
sent a keepalive in this interval. This means we have to send a single UDP packet
every 5 minutes for a spoofed IP to persist in the peer list. On top of the node not
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being able to receive incoming messages in a timely fashion because of the flood,
having a very large list of such peers means most of the outgoing messages that the
node tries to send will fail because these IPs will make up most of the
√
peers set.
This makes this an effective DoS vector against a Nano node.
To illustrate how simple this attack is to execute, listing 2.2 provides the
complete Python function that can be run as is to flood fake keepalive messages to
a Nano node. It uses the scapy Python library to spoof UDP packets.
Listing 2.2: Python function to flood keepalive packets
def f l o o d k e e p a l i v e ( l i m i t =42 ∗ 10 ∗∗ 6 , dst=’ l o c a l h o s t ’ ) :
from scapy . a l l import RandIP , IP , UDP, send
import s t r u c t
port , magic number = 7075 , b ’RC’
v , type , ext = 0x09 , 2 , 0
payload = s t r u c t . pack ( ’<2sBBBBH ’ , magic number , v ,
v , v , type , ext )
for i in range ( 8 ) :
payload += s t r u c t . pack ( ’<16s ’ , b ’ 4 2 . 4 2 . 4 2 . 4 2 ’ )
payload += s t r u c t . pack ( ’<H ’ , 4242)
s r c = RandIP ( )
for i in range ( l i m i t ) :
ip = IP ( s r c=str ( s r c ) , dst=dst )
udp = UDP( spor t=port , dport=port )
spoo f ed packet = ip / udp / payload
send ( spoofed packet , i f a c e=” lo0 ” , verbose=False )
Listing 2.3 shows a single execution of this function against a locally running
Nano node. This node was isolated and modified to drop outgoing packets. 1000
peers were added to the peer table in under 4 seconds.
Listing 2.3: Flood demo
In [ 1 ] : from nano import RPCClient
In [ 2 ] : rpc = RPCClient ( ’ http :// l o c a l h o s t :7076 ’ )
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In [ 3 ] : rpc . v e r s i o n ( )
Out [ 3 ] : { ’ node vendor ’ : ’ RaiBlocks 13 .0 ’ , ’ r p c v e r s i o n ’ : 1 ,
’ s t o r e v e r s i o n ’ : 10}
In [ 4 ] : len ( rpc . pee r s ( ) )
Out [ 4 ] : 0
In [ 5 ] : %time f l o o d k e e p a l i v e ( l i m i t =1000)
CPU times : user 2 .68 s , sys : 505 ms , t o t a l : 3 .19 s
Wall time : 3 .72 s
In [ 6 ] : len ( rpc . pee r s ( ) )
Out [ 6 ] : 1000
Since there is no limit on the number of peers in the table, memory usage of
the node increases substantially under this attack. Table 2.3 shows the increase in
memory and CPU of the node under the flood of just one instance of the function.
The node became unresponsive after which the test had to stopped.
One possible fix for this issue would be a handshake with a randomly generated
ID used in the ping/pong. This is already implemented in Ethereum.
2.7.2 Frontier requests
A Nano node makes a frontier request to one of its peers once every 5 minutes.
This is done to ensure that the latest block for each account is the same across both
peers. The response to this request is the list of all accounts and their latest block
hash. There are currently ≈ 550000 accounts. Account and block hashes are 32-
bytes each. So each node requests 32MB of data every 5 minutes. If a peer receives
multiple frontier requests, its outbound bandwidth usage will be even higher. We
collected responses to frontier requests from a production node for over 5 hours.
Figure 2.3a shows the number of accounts returned for each request. But the actual
number of accounts changing within each interval is very low as seen Figure 2.3b.
This is because Nano has a low transaction rate at the moment.
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Table 2.3: Keepalive flooding results
Time(seconds) Number of peers Memory (MB) CPU(%)
0 0 5.3 0.08
30 5262 13 2.8
60 12008 22.8 6.4
90 17353 30.4 9.5
120 22309 41.7 12.6
150 27790 50.8 16.6
180 33696 58.5 20.5
210 38046 70 24.7
240 41500 77.1 27
270 50955 89.5 34
300 59467 105.8 39.6
330 68190 120.5 48.2
360 77217 136.1 53.6
390 65450 133.9 82.8
420 74034 132.8 90.1
450 82802 147.8 126
480 76119 142.3 136.4
510 84928 150.5 142
540 69847 157.9 175.6
570 78281 153.9 186
600 86785 149 191.6
Figure 2.3: Frontier request statistics
(a) Number of accounts fetched
(b) Number of modified accounts
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Figure 2.4: Frontier requests with IBLTs
(a) Size of IBLT for each request
(b) Time taken to construct and transfer
IBLTs
This is a situation tailor-made for IBLTs because we have two sets whose
difference is low in need of reconciliation. We inserted the collected data for each
request into an IBLT and subtracted it from the IBLT constructed for the data
from the previous request. The keys in the IBLT are the block hashes instead of the
account hashes because most transactions change the frontiers of existing accounts.
Accounts are stored in the value field of the IBLT. A new account is also reflected by
a new frontier block and thus will be recovered along with the other block hashes in
the new IBLT. We modified the size of the IBLT until all the new block hashes were
recovered. Figure 2.4a shows the size of the IBLT constructed for each request.
Note that the every frontier request at the moment downloads 32MB of data at
the moment regardless of the number of accounts that may have changed since the
previous request. The size of the IBLT reflects this delta. Only around 1MB of
data would have transferred over 5 hours of frontier requests if IBLTs were in use.
Instead each Nano node downloaded over 1.5GB of data in the same period. Each
frontier request took ≈6 seconds to download all data. We measured the time it
takes to build and transfer each IBLT (Figure 2.4b). This metric also improves to a
few hundred milliseconds from 6 seconds. Multiparty set reconciliation described in
[49] could be applied to this problem by expanding the scope of a frontier request
to a subset of peers instead of a single peer.
3. Ethereum
3.1 Node Discovery
Every node in ethereum has a private key. This key is separate from pri-
vate keys associated with accounts that may be local to this node, for example
the node’s coinbase account if it is a miner1 . The corresponding public key be-
comes this node’s ID. This ID is then used to construct a node designator of the
form enode://<node ID>@<node IP>:<node Port>. We have the option of using
a different port for node discovery separate from the port used for general node-to-
node communication. The discovery protocol uses UDP whereas node-to-node com-
munication uses Ethereum’s home-rolled RLPx on top of TCP. If these two ports
are separate, the node designator will be of the form enode://<node ID>@<node
IP>:<TCP Port>?discport=<UDP Port>.
The enode descriptors of bootstrap nodes are configured in code. Geth stores
peer information from a session in a Level DB [28] key-value database. We have
the option of specifying an on-disk file name for this database without which the
database is maintained in memory. If a previous valid node database file is specified,
at most 30 seed nodes that we communicated with in the last 5 days are picked at
random and added to the bootstrap list. Bonding is then initiated with each node
from the bootstrap list. It consists of sending a Ping message with a randomly
generated ID and waiting for a Pong (see Networking Protocol for structure of
these messages) with the same ID. The number of concurrent bondings in progress
is limited to 16. On successful bonding, the peer is added to the routing table. A
thread is now started to drop peers that are already present in our database from
previous runs and haven’t successfully bonded in the last 24 hours. This is to reduce
the impact of dropping potentially useful seed nodes if the node is coming back to
the network after a long time. This expirer thread runs the drop once every hour.
The construction of the routing table and even the concept of node IDs is based
1Private keys in Ethereum in are 32-bytes long and generated using the secp256k1 elliptic curve
algorithm. The corresponding public key is 64-bytes because it is a point (x, y) on the curve being
used.
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on a peer-to-peer DHT protocol called Kademlia [20]. Kademlia uses a distance
metric based on the xor of node IDs to sort the routing table. Ethereum uses the
256-bit SHA3 hash of the node IDs instead of the 512-bit public key because the
distribution of elliptic curve public keys is not uniform [22]. The table is divided
into 256 equal-sized buckets. The size of each bucket is 16 nodes. A node is added
to bucket i if the position of the first 1 bit in the xor of this node’s ID and our ID
is i. Since it is very unlikely for higher numbered buckets to be filled (the first i− 1
bits of two random SHA3 hashes have to match), Ethereum reduces the number of
buckets to 17 with the last bucket acting as a catch-all for IDs with i from 17 to 255.
Inside each bucket, nodes are sorted by when they were added. If a node is already
present in a bucket, it is bumped to the front. If the bucket is full, a bonding is
re-initiated with the least recently seen node in that bucket. The node which could
not be added is placed in a replacement list to be chosen when a node is removed by
failed bonding. There can be up to 10 replacement nodes for each bucket. A point
to note here is that Ethereum does not actually use this table for the purpose it is
meant for in Kademlia: to find nodes that store a particular key. No keys are being
stored here. One possible rationale maybe to allow future scaling options such as
sharding the blockchain.
The number of outbound connections to be established on start is determined
by a DialRatio which defaults to 3 and the maximum number of concurrent con-
nections a node can have is set to 25. This means that we can connect to 8 peers
at a time and the remaining slots are reserved for inbound connections. Before the
routing table is looked up, the node tries to dial static and trusted nodes specified
in the initial configuration. Outbound connections are established to trusted nodes
even if the limit has been reached. Dialing involves performing an handshake in-
volving the Hello and Status messages. If there are outbound slots remaining after
attempting to handshake with static and trusted nodes, the routing table kicks into
gear and we start by looking up a random node ID. Up to 32 nodes are fetched from
buckets closest to this node ID and a FindNode message containing this node ID is
sent to each peer. By this time, we should already be present in the peer’s routing
table from a previous bonding because a peer is added to our routing table only
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after a successful bonding to start with. The peer responds with a Neighbors mes-
sage containing 16 of its current peers that are closest to the sent ID. This message
can be split into multiple UDP packets. After bonding with these peers they are
inserted into the routing table with only 10 IPs from each /24 being allowed with a
further restriction of at most 2 per bucket.
3.2 Block Synchronization
There are two ways for synchronization with a remote peer to start: if the
number of peers reaches the desired minimum of 5 or by a force sync cycle that
runs every 10 seconds. The peer with the highest known total difficulty is chosen as
the best. This difficulty is retrieved during the handshake described above and also
reset whenever a new block is received from a peer. Another condition for sync to
begin is that the peer’s difficulty has to be higher than the difficulty of our latest
block. If the node is being started for the first time, a genesis block is generated
from a configuration embedded in code.2
The best peer’s head hash is fetched as a part of the Status message. This
header is now requested. Every time a request to a peer is made, a timer is set for the
current TTL which is determined using the methods given in algorithm 3. If there
is an error or a timeout, this peer is dropped. If the header is fetched, the common
ancestor block is determined between our local latest block and the remote head.
The floor limit for this search is curLocalHead − 3 ∗ proofOfWorkEpoch. The
current epoch is 30000 blocks and means that a new DAG is generated in the ethash
[21] mining algorithm that Ethereum uses. This means that a peer is not chosen
for synchronization if it is on a fork that is separated by more than 90000 blocks
from our own chain. To determine the ancestor, we first start at (curLocalHead−
maxHeaderFetch) and fetch headers at a step of 16. maxHeaderFetch is set to 192
so we fetch a total of 12 headers. These headers are checked in the descending order
of block number and the first header that is found on the local chain is considered
2As an interesting aside, the extra data field in the main network’s genesis block was chosen to
be the hash of a future block on the test network. Block number 1028201 was chosen because it
is a palindrome and prime [23]. This was done so that every participant could generate the same
block while still utilizing some randomness.
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as the ancestor. If this method fails, a binary search is initiated between the genesis
block and curLocalHead.
Algorithm 3 Fetch the current TTL threshold
1: rtt← 20 . Initialization
2: rttConf ← 1 . Confidence in our estimate
3: ttlScaling ← 3
4: ttlLimit← 60
5: qosTuningImpact← 0.25
6: procedure TuneQOS . Runs as a separate thread every 20 seconds
7: rtt ← (1 − qosTuningImpact) ∗ rtt + qosTuningImpact ∗
GetPeerMedianRTT
8: rttConf ← rttConf + (1− rttConf)/2 . Increase confidence in our
estimate
9: end procedure
10: procedure GetTTL
11: ttl← ttlScaling ∗ rtt/rttConf
12: if ttl >ttlLimit then
13: return ttlLimit
14: else
15: return ttl
16: end if
17: end procedure
Concurrent processes are started to fetch headers, bodies and receipts in seg-
ments from different peers using this ancestor. A receipt in Ethereum captures the
logs generated by transactions which are calls to smart contract functions. As pro-
tection against peers sending bad headers, a skeleton is first built by requesting a
subset of headers from the best peer. The rule for this subset is to fetch every header
at a step of maxHeaderFetch on the peer’s chain starting from the ancestor until
the number of headers in this subset is 128. Each of the header in this subset now
becomes the start point for a header fetch from a different peer. Each fetch request
is limited to maxHeaderFetch headers.
After a segment of data is fetched from a peer, its throughput and RTT stats
are updated. The median RTT obtained during the fetch is used to tune the TTL
timer that we set for each request. This tuning is performed once every RTT
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seconds. The estimated RTT is weighted by a confidence score which is decreased
by a factor of nPeers− 1/nPeers each time a new peer is added to our peer list .
This decrease happens only if the number of peers is less than 10.
3.3 Block Propagation
When a new block is mined or received, it’s hash is sent in a NewBlockHashes
message to all peers. The entire block is then sent to a square root of the number
of peers.
A new block message also includes the sender’s total difficulty (TD) which is
the cumulative sum of the difficulties of all the blocks preceding the current block.
The receiver does not know if the included TD is truthful since calculating the true
TD requires validating the entire chain up to this point and not every block in the
chain might be present yet. Hence, an estimate is made by summing of the new
block’s difficulty and the TD of its parent. This difficulty is used to pick the best
peer for synchronization that we saw above. When the block is actually imported
into the full chain, the calculated TD is compared to the advertised TD and the
peer is dropped as malicious if there is a mismatch. Each peer also has a queue
limit of 64 new blocks as an anti-DoS measure. The new block is also discarded
if it is older than the current head by more than 7 blocks (uncle limit) or ahead
by over 32 blocks. Rebroadcast of the block happens as soon as the header is
verified without the transactions themselves being checked. If the block competes
against the current head block, it is stored away without processing until the total
difficulty of this competing chain overtakes the canonical chain in which case this
chain becomes canonical.
3.4 Block Storage
Ethereum uses the LevelDB key-value store for all of its data storage. This
means that all of Ethereum’s internal data structures have to be converted to a
key/value format before being stored on disk. This is achieved using a custom
serialization protocol called Recursive Length Prefix (RLP). A data object such as
a block header, transaction, peer information is encoded into RLP. The keccak256
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hash of this encoded data becomes the key and the RLP-encoded data itself is the
value when inserted into LevelDB. Please refer to Appendix B for examples of RLP
encoding and decoding.
To efficiently store and retrieve the state of execution of smart contracts,
Ethereum uses a trie data structure — specifically a variant known as a Patricia
Trie. This trie is combined with the properties of a general Merkle tree [24] to
provide cryptographic guarantees about the presence of data. Bitcoin uses Merkle
trees to efficiently represent the transactions in a block. Only the root of the Merkle
tree for a block is stored in the header. Any change to a transaction causes a change
in the root thus changing the block header. Along with the root of the transaction
trie, Ethereum also stores the root of the state trie and the receipts trie in the block
header. Transaction tries and receipt tries are unique to a block whereas a state trie
is a global data structure containing information about all contract accounts.
Smart contracts can be accessed on the blockchain using addresses of the same
format as a normal currency-holding account. In the trie, the kecccak256 hash of
this contract address forms the path from the root to the leaf which is the RLP
encoding of the Account object. This objects consists of fields for nonce (updated
after every transaction involving this account to prevent replays), balance, hash of
the smart contract code and a reference to the root of a separate trie which stores
the values of variables associated with this smart contract. References to other tries
or nodes within the same trie are just the keys for that corresponding node in the
LevelDB database. Each contract account has its own storage trie.
A detailed walk-through of how these tries are constructed and a general ex-
planation of Merkle Patricia trees is given in Appendix C.
Since LevelDB does not have an explicit concept of tables, Ethereum uses key
prefixes to identify column classes. As an example, table 3.1 lists the mechanism
used to store the routing table.
Ethereum uses Bloom filters internally to record the presence of events in the
logs generated for a transaction. As mentioned above, these logs are captured in the
receipt for a block. Smart contracts can emit events while execution. These events
can only be instances of registered topics. Each topic has a list of variables captured
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Table 3.1: Schema for routing table used in node discovery
Key Value
<node id>+ ”:discover” RLP encoding of node details such as ad-
dress, port, node ID and time of addition to
routing table.
<node id>+ ”:discover:ping” Time of last ping sent
<node id>+ ”:discover:pong” Time of last received pong received
Table 3.2: Top 5 ASNs with public Ethereum nodes
ASNum Name Percentage of nodes
16509 AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US 9.2
45102 CNNIC-ALIBABA-CN-NET-AP Al-
ibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd.,
CN
8.4
14618 AMAZON-AES - Amazon.com, Inc.,
US
4.3
14061 DIGITALOCEAN-ASN - DigitalO-
cean, LLC, US
3.4
37963 CNNIC-ALIBABA-CN-NET-AP
Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising
Co.,Ltd., CN
3.3
in the event.
3.5 Network Analysis
Our crawler simulates a bonding and sends a FindNodes message to extract
peer information. The collected data was augmented and verified by multiple ex-
ternal sources [37]. Over 19000 public nodes were detected.
Figure 3.1 shows a break down of public nodes by country. Ethereum’s net-
work is well decentralized with nodes spread out over 2000 Autonomous Systems as
illustrated in Figure 3.2b. However, the top 5 ASNs still contain almost 30% of the
nodes and all of them belong to large cloud providers. Any outage at these services
could mean a significant loss of hashing power as Ethereum still uses a Proof of
Work based consensus scheme. (Table 3.2)
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Figure 3.1: Country-wise distribution of 19121 public Ethereum nodes
Figure 3.2: ASNs containing public Ethereum nodes
(a) CDF (b) Count
3.6 Networking Protocol
Ping, Pong, FindNodes and Neighbors are messages are transmitted via UDP.
The remaining messages use TCP.
1. Ping
Fields :
(a) version
(b) from
(c) to
(d) expiration
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2. Pong
Fields :
(a) to: This field should be the same as the from address in the corresponding
Ping packet.
(b) replytok: Hash of the corresponding Ping packet.
(c) expiration: Timestamp after which this packet becomes invalid.
3. FindNodes
Fields :
(a) target: A 32-byte address which does not have to be an actual node ID
(See Node Discovery for more details about Kademlia lookup)
(b) expiration
4. Neighbors
Fields :
(a) nodes: A list of real nodes IDs.
(b) expiration
5. Hello
Fields :
(a) version: Version of the P2P protocol to be used for communication
(b) client version string: Identify the node software (eg. geth, parity)
similar to a User Agent string
(c) capabilities: Name and version of protocols supported. This is used
to determine if any sub protocols such as the Light Ethereum Subclient
are supported.
(d) listen port: Defaults to 30303
(e) remote pubkey: Our node ID
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6. Status
Fields :
(a) protocol version: Subprotocol chosen from the capabilities sent in
the previous Hello message.
(b) network id: Identify main, test or private networks.
(c) total difficulty: Extracted from the latest block at the head of the
chain
(d) best hash: Hash of the latest block
(e) genesis hash
7. GetBlockHeaders
Fields :
(a) block number or hash: Get all headers from this hash or block number
(b) max headers: Do not fetch more than this number of headers
(c) skip: Block number to skip
(d) reverse:Send latest headers first
8. BlockHeaders
Fields :
(a) An RLP-encoded list of block headers where each header has the following
fields:
i. parent hash
ii. uncles hash: Combined hash of the headers of all uncle blocks of
this block
iii. coinbase: Address of the miner
iv. state root: Hash of the root of the state trie after this block has
been imported (See Block Storage for details)
v. receipt root
vi. transaction root
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vii. bloom: Used to verify the presence of logs in the receipt trie.
viii. difficulty
ix. block number
x. gas limit
xi. gas used
xii. timestamp
xiii. extra data
xiv. mix hash: Generated from the DAG used by ethash. Used in diffi-
culty verification.
xv. nonce
9. GetBlockBodies
Fields :
(a) hashes: An RLP encoded stream of block hashes whose bodies are being
requested.
10. BlockBodies
Fields :
A list of RLP encoded block bodies. Each block body is itself composed of a
list of transactions and a list of uncle headers.
3.7 Experiments
3.7.1 Blockchain Analysis
To estimate the amount of duplicate transaction data being transferred dur-
ing block propagation, we analysed more than 5.5 million blocks starting from
Ethereum’s genesis block in 2015 to blocks up to April 29 2018 were analysed.
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of number of transactions in a block. Over 75%
of blocks historically have had no transactions in them. Things improve when only
blocks from 2018 are considered (Figure 3.4) where there is an almost even distri-
bution between 0-150 transactions.
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Figure 3.3: Transaction count distribution across ≈5.5 million blocks
Figure 3.4: Transaction count distribution across ≈700000 blocks in 2018
Figure 3.5 shows that though the number of transactions per block has stabi-
lized, the average size per transaction continues to grow. This is because a larger
number of transactions are calls to Smart Contract functions which include input
data. Figure 3.6 shows the distribution between Smart Contract function calls
and regular value transfer transactions in blocks between April 29th and April 30th.
There are on average 5 Smart Contract calls for every regular transaction. The
input field in Smart Contract calls has an average size of ≈ 311 bytes. This field is
empty for regular transactions.
3.7.2 Graphene in Geth
We first describe the normal course of propagation of a block in Geth be-
fore looking at the changes made for Graphene. When a new block is mined, it
is first propagated in full to
√
peers via a NewBlockMsg. A full block includes
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Figure 3.5: Average transaction size and count over time
Figure 3.6: Share of Smart Contract calls
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the block header, list of transactions and list of uncle block headers. The block
hash is then announced to all peers via a NewBlockHashesMsg. Upon receiving
a NewBlockHashesMsg a peer sends out separate request for headers and body
via GetBlockHeaders and GetBlockBodies messages. Once a full block has been
fetched and only its header verified, it is pushed in full to
√
peers. After the block
transactions are verified and the block is ready to be imported into the blockchain,
its hash is announced to all peers.
The implementation for Graphene starts by disabling full block broadcasts.
Only NewBlockHashesMsgs are sent. The response to these messages are GetGrapheneMsg
messages which contain the number of pending transactions at the receiver. The
sender now constructs a GrapheneMsg containing a Bloom filter and an IBLT. The
sender also sends This message also includes the number of transactions in the block
which is used to verify transaction recovery and the number of cells in the IBLT
which is needed for the receiver to construct their own IBLT. Only the first five bytes
of the transaction hash are inserted into the Bloom filter and IBLT. This provides
a reasonable degree of randomness while reducing the number of bytes required. To
recover transaction indices, we have implemented the lexicographic sort technique
mentioned in the Graphene paper. To do this, the sender sorts the extracted short
transaction IDs. This list is used to construct an array of integers indicating the
index of the transaction. At the receiver’s end, after the extra transactions added
because of the Bloom Filter’s fpr are detected by the IBLT, we check if the re-
maining transactions that passed through the Bloom Filter equal the number of
transactions in the block. If the number is greater, it means that some transac-
tions from the block are missing from the receivers pending list and we resend a
GetGrapheMsg by doubling the size of the included pending list. If remote trans-
action IDs are recovered from the IBLT subtraction, we send a GetTxMsg for these
IDs. This message does not exist in Ethereum’s RPC protocol and was implemented
newly for Graphene. Lastly, the GrapheneMsg message also includes the list of uncle
block headers. This provides the receiver sufficient information to reassemble the
list of transactions and uncle block headers and queue the block for validation and
import into the blockchain.
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Figure 3.7: Block propagation sizes for 50 blocks starting at block 5531100
Table 3.3: Average processing time for block propagation messages
GetBlockBodiesMsg GetGrapheneMsg BlockBodiesMsg GrapheneMsg
26.09µs 1.39ms 1.171ms 14.04ms
We ran the implementation against 50 blocks from April 29, 2018. The size
of the mempool was kept constant at 60000. An analysis of historical pending
transaction count [26] shows that this is a comfortable upper bound. To simulate the
presence of 60000 transactions in the pending list, an array of random 5-byte strings
was prepopulated. After real transactions from the pending list were tested against
the Bloom Filter and inserted into the IBLT, this array was iterated over. Figure 3.7
shows the sizes of RLP encoding of the blocks which was actually transmitted across
the wire. Thus, we account for all serialization overheads added by the different data
structures. We observe an 8x improvement on average.
We also tracked the impact of building and checking the Bloom Filters and
IBLTs. Table 3.3 shows the average time taken comparing corresponding mes-
sages from the normal Ethereum protocol against ones implemented by Graphene.
Table 3.4: Breakdown of GrapheneMsg processing
Deserialize received data 135.08µs
Test pending list against Bloom filter 13.91ms
Decode IBLT 41.32µs
Sort and extract transaction IDs 128.63µs
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Though the increase might seem substantial, the times posted should still be very
fast in the context of normal operations of an Ethereum node. Because of the
cost involved in checked the size of the pending list, the average time taken for
NewBlockHashesMsg also went up from 29.24µs to 131.92µs. Table 3.4 provides a
detailed listing of the times taken by different components involved in processing a
GrapheneMsg. Almost all of the huge time increase is because of the cost of checking
over 60K keys in the Bloom Filter.
4. IOTA
4.1 Node Discovery
IOTA does not have an automatic node discovery mechanism. Neighbors have
to be manually configured either at start or added via the addNeighbors HTTP
API. To successfully communicate with a neighbor, the peer must also run the
addNeighbors command locally on their end to add our address and port to their
valid neighbors list. No other form of handshake or validation occurs before messages
are transmitted to and from this neighbor. The project developers recommend
finding peers in dedicated channels on sites like Discord or Reddit. However, there
is a third-party project called Nelson which provides automated peer management
for IOTA. It does this by accessing the addNeighbors and removeNeighbors HTTP
APIs locally and communicating with other peers running Nelson via its own HTTP
messages.
If no neighbors are listed when starting Nelson, it fetches a static list of entry
nodes from Github [29]. This initial list of neighbors is considered trusted and
priority is given to these nodes when connecting or advertising to other Nelson
instances by setting their weight to 1. A websocket connection is established to each
of the neighbors with details about the IOTA node (fetched via the get node info
API) passed in the header. Upon receiving a websocket connection, the neighboring
Nelson instance will check if the two IOTA nodes are compatible (both nodes should
agree on using either UDP or TCP for communication). If the connection is valid,
the requesting node is added as a peer with an initial weight of 0. The neighbor then
responds on the same websocket connection with a list of up to 6 of its neighbors
sorted by weight, peer quality and connection age (see algorithm 4). The health of
the IOTA node is checked every 15 seconds via the get node info and get neighbors
IOTA APIs. The get neighbors API reports the number of random transaction
requests, new transactions and invalid transactions per active peer. This information
is used by Nelson to determine the peer quality.
Peer connections are managed in terms of epochs with the default epoch in-
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Algorithm 4 Peer trust calculation in Nelson
1: procedure GetPeerQuality(invalidTxs, randomTxRequests, newTxs)
2: badTxThreshold← 3
3: badTxs← invalidTxs+ randomTxRequests
4: badTxRatio← (invalidTxs ∗ 5 + randomTxRequests)/newTxs+ 1
5: if not istrusted(peer) and newTxs = 0 and badTxs > badTxThreshold
then
6: penalty ← 1/(badTxs+ 1)
7: else
8: penalty ← 1
9: end if
10: return (1/badTxRatio+ 1) ∗ penalty
11: end procedure
12: peerScore ← connectionAge ∗ getpeerquality(get node info(peer)) ∗ (1 +
peerWeight ∗ 10)
terval being 1200 seconds. Every time a new epoch is started, a random number of
peers are dropped and connections are re-established anew with our node assuming
a new identity. Within each epoch, peers are periodically checked for health in every
cycle with the default cycle interval set to 60 seconds. If a peer has not sent new
transactions in the last 5 minutes, it is considered lazy and dropped. The IOTA
node itself reruns DNS resolution for all its neighbors every 180 seconds.
4.2 Block Synchronization
Since IOTA has no explicit concept of a block, let’s take a look at how trans-
actions are linked together which will then let us understand how transactions are
requested and transmitted.
In a nutshell, IOTA works by having each transaction approve two previous
transactions by including their hashes in its signature. Unapproved transactions are
called tips. This tree-like data structure is called tangle. A transaction’s confir-
mation confidence is given by the number of times a valid tip selected by the tip
selection algorithm approves it either directly or indirectly. The tip selection algo-
rithm is a weighted random walk starting from the genesis transaction. The weights
ensure that ‘lazy’ tips — tips that approve old transactions and thus keep the tangle
43
from moving forward — are discouraged. The cumulative weight of a transaction is
the count of the number of approvers it has.
Transactions are considered confirmed with a confidence of 100% if they are
approved by a milestone transaction which is generated every minute by a special
account known as the coordinator. The coordinator’s address is hardcoded and
controlled by the IOTA developers. The current plan is to keep the coordinator
functioning until the network has enough vested participants to generate steady,
valid traffic. Like Nano, all of the IOTA that can ever exist was created in the
genesis transaction (333 − 1/2).
To keep the transaction size small enough to fit into a single datagram packet,
a transaction is divided into sub-transactions all of which belong to the same bun-
dle. There are four types of sub-transactions and all sub-transactions of the same
type have the same index. Index 0 contains sub-transactions which specify the re-
ceiving accounts and values for this transaction. Index 1 sub-transactions specify
the sending addresses and the first part of transaction signatures. The value of
these transactions is negative because coins are being spent. The second half of the
signatures are present in index 2 sub-transactions. Index 3 sub-transactions specify
the change addresses to which remaining balance should be sent if input is greater
than output. All sub-transactions share the same bundle hash separate from the
transaction hashes that uniquely identify each transaction.
All transactions in a bundle except the last contain the same branch hash.
Branch is the name given to one of the two previous transactions that each transac-
tion has to approve. This hash belongs to a random transaction not in this bundle
and has to be a tip. A trunk transaction is the second transaction approved by a
transaction. Trunk transactions are used to chain transactions inside a bundle to-
gether. A sub-transaction at index 0 will have the hash of a sub-transaction at index
1 in its trunk field. For the last transaction in the bundle, the branch transaction
of the previous transactions become the trunk and the branch transaction is a new
random tip. Each bundle in effect approves two external transactions.
If a transaction’s confirmation confidence does not increase in a reasonable
amount of time because of almost similar cumulative weights during tip selection
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and the algorithm’s preference for newer tips, the entire bundle can be reattached
to the tangle. This requires replaying the transactions by regenerating the proof of
work included in each transaction. This changes the transaction hash but the bundle
hash remains the same and the node can detect the reattachment and discard the
old attachments. If the reattached transactions are still consistent (valid path to
genesis), the promote API generates zero-value transactions which will approve this
transaction and a milestone transaction as a way of increasing the confirmation
confidence.
A snapshot text file containing account balances is generated periodically by
the IOTA developers and bundled with the code. On boot, this file’s signature
is validated with a hard coded public key and the internal state of accounts is
updated. The corresponding milestone transaction number provided is used as the
latest known milestone index.
IOTA does not differentiate the first time a node starts from the general op-
eration of a node. There is no special download of transactions. After the snapshot
is loaded, the procedure described in the Block Propagation section kicks in.
4.3 Block Propagation
A tipsRequestingPacket message is sent to all neighbors every 5 seconds. This
request contains the latest known milestone transaction’s hash appended as a re-
quest to the hashes of the bundle, branch and trunk transactions and the receiver
address of the same milestone transaction. This is because all messages in IOTA
piggyback a request for another transaction when themselves sending a transaction.
In this case, since the requested transaction hash is the same as the sent transaction,
the receiver responds with a random tip transaction with a probability of 0.66. This
happens only if the receiver itself has transactions to be requested in which case it
responds with a sendingPacket message containing the random tip and a random
transaction from its request queue. The transaction being requested will be a mile-
stone transaction with a probability of 0.7. Thus, a sendingPacket has a different
requested transaction and included transaction whereas a tipsRequestingPacket
has the same for both.
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If a node does not have the transaction requested in the sendingPacket or
tipsRequestingPacket message it is added to its request queue with a probability
of 0.01. If transaction in the message is valid, the receiver broadcasts it to all
its neighbors. The transaction is considered solid if both its branch and trunk
transactions are themselves solid. If either the branch or trunk is not present, it is
added to the request queue and the transaction is not considered solid. When an
entire sub tangle becomes solid, the snapshot is updated to reflect the new balances
for the accounts in the transactions in this sub tangle.
4.4 Block Storage
IOTA uses RocksDB [27], a Facebook derivative of Google’s LevelDB, the key-
value store we’ve seen being used in Ethereum and also used in Bitcoin. RocksDB
offers support for column families for the key-value pairs. We’ve seen application-
level schemas being defined in other projects which then transform to prefixes for
fixed-format string keys while writing to the key-value stores. RocksDB provides this
logical partitioning at the persistence layer itself. Two separate column families can
be written to concurrently while still maintaining atomicity. Each column family can
be configured separately, for example with different cache and compaction settings.
In addition RocksDB provides improved performance by using Bloom filters, support
for transactions among other improvements and faster in-memory data store [38].
IOTA uses the following column families: tag, bundle, approvee, address,
stateDiff,milestone, transaction-metadata, transaction
In addition, IOTA also has the functionality to publish to a message queue
running ZeroMQ [31] or exporting the blockchain to a file while the node is in
operation.
4.5 Network Analysis
Using Nelson’s information as the base, information about 470 IOTA’s nodes
was collected. This data was verified and augmented by data collected from [36].
IOTA’s network is extremely centralized with the top 3 ASNs containing more
than half of the nodes (Figures 4.2a and 4.2b).
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Table 4.1: Top 5 ASNs with public IOTA nodes
ASNum Name Percentage of nodes
51167 CONTABO - Contabo GmbH 20.9
14061 DIGITALOCEAN-ASN - DigitalOcean 18.1
24940 HETZNER-AS - Hetzner Online
GmbH
11.5
197540 NETCUP-AS - netcup GmbH 8.7
15169 AS - GOOGLE 6.4
Figure 4.1: Country-wise distribution of 470 public IOTA nodes
A curiosity to note here is that ASN 14061 has the highest number of Nano
nodes and the second highest number of IOTA nodes.
4.6 Networking Protocol
The two message types in IOTA tipsRequestingPacket and sendingPacket
are datagram packets of size 1650 bytes by default. They consist of a serialized
transaction and a request for another transaction.
4.7 Experiments
IOTA uses the solidity of transactions to determine if a sub-tangle headed
by a milestone can be used to update the account balance snapshot. This means
that when a tip arrives, its branch and trunk transactions are checked for solidity.
This involves fetching the transaction from disk and testing its isSolid attribute.
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Figure 4.2: ASNs containing public IOTA nodes
(a) CDF (b) Count
Instead, we could use an in-memory Cuckoo filter to speed up checks for non-solid
transactions. A Cuckoo filter is a probabilistic data structure akin to Bloom filters
but provides constant time lookups and inserts and more importantly, constant time
delete and list operations. It also has better space efficiency when the desired the
false positive rate is less than 0.03. IOTA via RocksDB also has the option of using a
Bloom filter for a sorted static table (SST) storing a column family but it is currently
unused. Even if it is used, supporting deletions would require the use of Bloom filter
variants like Counting Bloom filters [47] which have much worse operation efficiency
than Cuckoo filters.
Our algorithm works as follows: All non-solid transactions are inserted into a
Cuckoo filter. When a tip arrives, it’s branch and trunk transactions can be first
checked in the filter. If they are not present, we can be definitely sure that these
transactions are already solid. This saves a disk access and since the number of
non-solid transactions is bounded under normal operation, the size of the filter can
be small. Once a transaction becomes solid, it is deleted from the filter.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the results of a simplistic Python simulation of the
different filters. The results for Cuckoo filter could be much better with optimization
but they already have the huge advantage of supporting deletion over Bloom filters
with comparable times.
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Figure 4.3: Simulation of insertion in probabilistic filters
Figure 4.4: Simulation of access in probabilistic filters
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APPENDIX A
Graphene
We first present a general description of Graphene’s core components followed by a
listing of Graphene’s protocol for block transfer.
A.1 Bloom filters
A Bloom filter [45] is a probabilistic data structure used to efficiently answer
set membership queries. It has no false negatives and a configurable false positive
rate.
Let S = s1, s2, s3, ..., sn be a subset of strings from the universe U of all possible
strings such that U >> m. Bloom filter B = b1, b2, ..., bm is a bit-vector of length
m which can determine if a string s is in set S. A ‘yes’ answer may mean s is
in S. A no answer definitely means that s is not in S. We do this by choosing k
independent hash functions h1, h2, ..., hk. The false positive rate for a Bloom filter
can be obtained as follows:
The probability that a given bit l is not set after the inserting all m element
is:
(1− 1
m
)kn = e−
kn
m
The false positive rate is then simply the probability that a given bit l is set
after m insertions by k hash functions:
f = (1− (1− 1
m
)kn)k = (1− e− knm )k
By trying to minimize the derivate of the equation, we obtain the optimum
value for k, the number of hash functions:
k = ln2 ∗ m
n
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A.2 Invertible Bloom Lookup Table
An Invertible Bloom Lookup Table is a data structure that can store key-value
pairs. In a fashion similar to Bloom filters, each key-value pair is stored in k cells
determined by k independent hash functions. Each cell has a keySum, valueSum
and count field. When multiple key-value pairs map to the same cell, their keys
and values are XOR’ed to form a single sum (hence the −sum in the field names).
The count field tracks the number of key-value pairs in a cell. Insertions, deletions
and lookups can be performed on an IBLT in O(k) time. Insertions and deletions
always succeed. Key lookup and listing of all the key-value pairs are probabilistic
and succeed with a high probability if the number of pairs n in the IBLT is less than
a threshold parameter t. For an explanation about how this parameter is chosen,
please see [51].
A.3 Set Reconciliation using IBLT
We now see how an IBLT can be used for set reconciliation. As described
before, set reconciliation is the process of symmetrically synchronizing two identical
sets of elements which differ only by a few elements. IBLT achieves this with a low
overhead. Alice and Bob are in possession of sets SA and SB respectively which
they wish to reconcile. They each build an IBLT T separately by inserting elements
from their sets using hash functions h1, . . . , hk. Bob sends his IBLT over to Alice.
Note that the number of the cells in the IBLT is only dependent on the size of
the symmetric difference d between the two sets and not the number of elements.
Therefore there needs to be a prior round of communication to infer or calculate d.
Alice subtracts Bob’s IBLT from her own IBLT. Subtracting an IBLT consists
of the following steps:
1. Find a pure cell with count 1. The data in this cell is an actual set element
(K,V ) not combined with any other elements via an XOR sum.
2. Delete this element from all cells T [h1(K)], T [h2(K)]...T [hk(K)] in which (K,V )
was originally inserted. The operation to delete a key is the same as insertion
i.e we XOR the key to the current value in the cell which has the effect of
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removing that key from the cell.
3. If the above delete operation produced more pure cells, repeat Step 2 for the
element in this cell.
4. A key detail here is that a count of 1 does not guarantee a clean deletion of
all other keys. For example, consider cell C which contains the XOR of 4
elements:
C = a⊕ b⊕ c⊕ d
C now has the count 4. To extract the value d, we need to delete a, b and c
successively from C after which its count is 1. But if instead of c, some other
element e was deleted from this cell, the count reduces to 1 while the value
left behind is
C = d⊕ e
To tackle this, IBLTs include another field known as the hashKeySum field.
Before insertion, each key is hashed using a separate hash function H and
added to this field. The content of a pure field (K,V ) is valid only if H(K)
equals the corresponding value in the hashKeySum field.
All cells left behind with counts of 1 or -1 contain keys that were added or
missing from Alice’s set respectively.
A.4 Block Propagation using Graphene
Graphene relies on the Set Reconciliation method described above to determine
which transactions belong to a block. This is done without transferring the explicit
transaction hashes. The steps involved in propagating a Bitcoin block using the
Graphene protocol are:
1. A node in possession of a new block send an inv to all of its peers.
2. A peer responds with a getgraphene message. This message includes the size
m of the peer’s mempool. This value is necessary to calculate the size of the
symmetric difference as mentioned above.
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3. The sender node sends a graphene message containing a Bloom filter S and
IBLT I.
4. The receiving peer creates an IBLT I ′ from the transactions in its mempool
which are present in S. Because S can have false positives, I ′ can contain
transactions not in the block.
5. To further filter out these false positives, I is subtracted from I ′ to extract
the extraneous transaction IDs. This also gives us the IDs of any transaction
included in the block but not present in the receiver’s mempool. Separate
getdata messages are sent for each such transaction.
APPENDIX B
RLP
Recursive Length Prefix (RLP) is Ethereum’s homegrown serialization protocol. It
boils data down to only two distinct types: a string (sequence of bytes) and a list
of items (strings or nested lists).
By just looking at the first byte of an RLP-encoded stream, we can gain
sufficient information about the type and length of the data that follows. Let’s look
at the ranges of values for this byte and what they represent using the rlp python
library [25]:
1. 0 to 127 (0x00 to 0x7f): This value represents the actual data without any
serialization overhead being added. This data is a number less than 128 and
its interpretation is left to the process deserializing this stream i.e it may be
treated as an ASCII character or an integer.
Listing B.1: RLP encoding of a single byte
In [ 1 ] : r l p . encode (1 )
Out [ 1 ] : b ’\x01 ’
In [ 2 ] : r l p . encode (127)
Out [ 2 ] : b ’\ x7f ’
In [ 3 ] : # 0 f a l l s under the next case
In [ 3 ] : r l p . encode (0 )
Out [ 3 ] : b ’\x80 ’
2. 128 to 183 (0x80 to 0xb7): The RLP byte now indicates that the data that
follows is a string of length between 0 and 55 bytes. The length of the string
can be obtained by subtracting 128 from the value of this byte (which is the
encoding for 0 as seen above). This byte is then followed by the actual string.
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Listing B.2: RLP encoding of 0-55 byte strings
In [ 5 ] : r l p . encode ( ’ ’ )
Out [ 5 ] : b ’\x80 ’
In [ 6 ] : r l p . encode ( ’ a ’ ∗ 50)
Out [ 6 ] : b ’\xb2aaa . . . aaa ’
In [ 7 ] : 0xb2
Out [ 7 ] : 178
In [ 8 ] : 178 − 128
Out [ 8 ] : 50
3. 184 to 191 (0xb8 to 0xbf): Subtract this number by 183, let’s call this value
s. This means that the next s bytes indicate the length of the actual string
which will then follow. This means that we have 8 bytes to encode the length
of a string thereby giving us the maximum string length that can be encoded
in RLP: 264 − 1
Listing B.3: RLP encoding of long strings
# We need one by t e to r ep r e s en t 56
In [ 9 ] : r l p . encode ( ’ a ’ ∗ 56)
Out [ 9 ] : b ’\xb88aaaaaa . . . aa ’
In [ 1 0 ] : 0xb8
Out [ 1 0 ] : 184
In [ 1 1 ] : # The 8 comes in because the ASCII
In [ 1 1 ] : # va lue o f 8 i s 56
In [ 1 1 ] : chr (56)
Out [ 1 1 ] : ’ 8 ’
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In [ 1 2 ] : r l p . encode ( ’ a ’ ∗ 100)
Out [ 1 2 ] : b ’\xb8daaaaaa . . . aa ’
In [ 1 3 ] : chr (100)
Out [ 1 3 ] : ’ d ’
In [ 1 4 ] : r l p . encode ( ’ a ’ ∗ 1000)
Out [ 1 4 ] : b ’\xb9\x03\xe8aaaa . . . aaa ’
In [ 1 5 ] : 0xb9 − 0xb7
Out [ 1 5 ] : 2
In [ 1 6 ] : 0x03e8
Out [ 1 6 ] : 1000
4. 192 to 247 (0xc0 to 0xf7): The value now indicates that the combined
length of the RLP encoding of each item of a list is between 0 and 55 bytes.
The actual length is obtained by subtracting 192. This byte is followed by
the RLP encoding of the individual items themselves which can be recursively
decoded.
Listing B.4: RLP encoding of a single byte
In [ 1 7 ] : r l p . encode ( [ ’ a ’ ] )
Out [ 1 7 ] : b ’\xc1a ’
In [ 1 8 ] : 0xc1
Out [ 1 8 ] : 193
In [ 1 9 ] : r l p . encode ( [ ’ a ’ , ’ b ’ ] )
Out [ 1 9 ] : b ’\xc2ab ’
In [ 2 0 ] : r l p . encode ( [ ’ a ’ , ’ ab ’ ] )
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Out [ 2 0 ] : b ’\xc4a\x82ab ’
In [ 2 1 ] : # Note the l en g t h i s 4 b y t e s (0 xc4 )
In [ 2 1 ] : # because o f the l e n g t h by t e
In [ 2 1 ] : # inc luded from the RLP encoding o f ’ ab ’
5. 248 to 255 (0xf8 to 0xff): Similar to strings, these 8 values indicate that
the next 1-8 bytes indicate the combined length of the RLP encodings of a
list’s individual items.
Listing B.5: RLP encoding of a single byte
In [ 2 1 ] : r l p . encode ( [ ’ a ’ ∗ 5 6 ] )
Out [ 2 1 ] : b ’\ xf8 :\ xb88aaaaaa . . . aa ’
In [ 2 2 ] : len ( r l p . encode ( ’ a ’ ∗ 56))
Out [ 2 2 ] : 58
In [ 2 3 ] : chr (58)
Out [ 2 3 ] : ’ : ’
APPENDIX C
Tries in Ethereum
C.1 Trie vs Tree
A trie is used to store key-value pairs among other things. We start with an
empty key ” at the root of the trie. Traversing down a node increases the key by 1
character. A key can have a special child which does not append to the key but is
rather the value of this key in the dictionary (the null child). A trie (Figure C.1 is
also known as a prefix tree because keys with the same prefixes (first k characters
matching) are in the same sub-tree rooted at a node whose value is s1s2...sk.
C.2 Patricia Trie
A Patricia trie optimizes a trie further by merging a child node with its parent
if and only if the parent has no other children. When this happens, we can traverse
multiple characters at one skip down a level instead of one character per level in a
regular trie.
Figure C.2 is the Patricia trie version of the trie in Figure C.1
Figure C.1: A normal trie
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Figure C.2: Patricia trie
C.3 Merkle Patricia Trie
In Ethereum, keys in the trie are 32-byte hashes. The Merkle aspect comes
in because when a node refers to it child, it uses the keccak 256 hash of the RLP
encoding of the value of its child. This reference is then included as a part of the
parent’s RLP encoding i.e the parent’s parent includes the parent’s hash in its value
hence building a Merkle Tree.
Keys are represented using the hexadecimal format in the trie which means
each key has 64 nibbles. Each traversal down a level usually adds one nibble to the
key, unless we hit a special type of node which advances it by multiple nibbles (the
Patricia part).
Before we delve into the different types of nodes, a note on the value stored in
the leaves. When an object is to be inserted into the trie, for example a transaction,
its RLP encoding is computed and then its keccak 256 (32 byte) hash. This (hash,
RLP encoding of value) pair is stored in a key value datastore. This applies to a
node in the trie itself. When a parent refers to a child, it is the address of the
child in this datastore whose value is the RLP encoding of the child node itself (see
example for leaf node below to see how this works)
Tries are used in Ethereum to maintain account related state (balances etc.),
smart contract state, transactions and transaction receipts for each block.
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C.4 Types of nodes in an Ethereum Trie
1. A NULL node represented by an empty string:
Listing C.1: NULL node
In [ 1 ] : import t r i e
In [ 2 ] : t = t r i e . Tr ie (db={})
In [ 3 ] : t . root node
Out [ 3 ] : b ‘ ’
In [ 4 ] : t . root hash
Out [ 4 ] : b ‘V\xe8\ x1f \x17 . . . \ xb4 ! ’
In [ 5 ] : keccak ( r l p . encode (b ‘ ’ ) )
Out [ 5 ] : b ‘V\xe8\ x1f \x17\x1b\xccU . . . \ xb4 ! ’
In [ 6 ] : t . db
Out [ 6 ] : {}
2. A leaf node represented by a two-item list: item 1 is the path traversed to get
here i.e. the key and item 2 is the value.
Listing C.2: NULL node
In [ 7 ] : t = t r i e . Tr ie (db={})
In [ 8 ] : t . set (b ‘ 1 ’ , b ’ abc ’ )
In [ 9 ] : t . root node
Out [ 9 ] : [ b ‘ 1 ’ , b ‘ abc ’ ]
In [ 1 0 ] : t . root hash
Out [ 1 0 ] : b ‘\ x1 f t \xe9Y\xac\xcd &+.. .\ xca f ’
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In [ 1 1 ] : t . db
Out [ 1 1 ] : {b ‘\ x1 f t \xe9Y \ . . . \ xca f ’ : b ‘\ xc7\x82 1\x83abc ’ }
In [ 1 2 ] : r l p . encode ( [ b ‘ 1 ’ , b ‘ abc ’ ] )
Out [ 1 2 ] : b ‘\ xc7\x82 1\x83abc ’
In [ 1 3 ] : r l p . encode (b ‘ abc ’ )
Out [ 1 3 ] : b ‘\ x83abc ’
In [ 1 4 ] : keccak ( r l p . encode ( [ b ‘ 1 ’ , b ‘ abc ’ ] ) )
Out [ 1 4 ] : b ‘\ x1 f t \xe9Y\xac\xcd &+.. .\ xca f ’
You’ll notice that the path in the leaf node is ‘ 1’ and not ‘1’. The space is
inserted because a ’hex prefix’ is added as the first nibble of the trie path.
This prefix is used to differentiate between a leaf node and an extension node
(covered next) and to also signal if the number of nibbles in the path is odd
or even. If there are an even number of nibbles in the path, a ‘0’ (0000) nibble
is suffixed to the hex prefix nibble because we cannot have a dangling byte
made up of only one nibble. The current pre-defined values for the hex prefix
nibble are:
(a) 3 (0011) - Leaf node with odd number of nibbles (does not need a ‘0’
nibble suffix between the hex prefix nibble evens things out)
(b) 2 (0010) - Leaf node with even number of nibbles (needs a ‘0’ nibble
suffix)
(c) 1 (0001) - Extension node with odd number of nibbles (does not need a
‘0’ nibble suffix)
(d) 0 (0000) - Extension node with even number of nibbles (needs a ‘0’
nibble suffix)
With that out of the way, how did we then end up with ‘ 1’? The comments
in the code sample below attempt an explanation:
Listing C.3: NULL node
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# The key ‘1 ’ when conver ted to a n i b b l e path becomes
# the n i b b l e s ‘3 ’ and ‘1 ’ because 31 i s the
# hexadecimal e q u i v a l e n t o f the ASCII va lue # of 1 (49)
In [ 1 5 ] : t r i e . u t i l s . n i b b l e s . b y t e s t o n i b b l e s (b ‘ 1 ’ )
Out [ 1 5 ] : (3 , 1)
# Since we have an even number o f n i b b l e s (2 ) and
# t h i s i s a l e a f node , our hex p r e f i x i s 2 and we
# add the 0 n ibb l e s u f f i x
In [ 1 5 ] : t r i e . u t i l s . n i b b l e s . n i b b l e s t o b y t e s ( ( 2 , 0 , 3 , 1 ) )
Out [ 1 5 ] : b ‘ 1 ’
# 20 i s the hexadecimal r e p r e s en t a t i on o f the number
# 32 which i s the ASCII va lue o f wh i t e space ‘ ’
In [ 1 6 ] : int ( ‘20 ’ , base =16)
Out [ 1 6 ] : 32
In [ 1 7 ] : chr (32)
Out [ 1 7 ] : ‘ ’
